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Abstract
With the increased presence of foreign institutional investors in emerging stock markets, academic
interest on the effects of foreign institutions on corporate managerial decisions has notably in-
creased. This paper joins this debate by investigating the effects of foreign institutional ownership
on cash holdings, a strategic corporate financing choice. Analysing a sample of firms from 23
emerging economies, the paper shows that, while foreign institutional ownership has a negative
effect on cash holdings, it also increases the contribution of cash to firm valuation. These effects are
potentially transmitted to cash through mitigation of agency conflicts and alleviation of financing
constraints. In all, our findings suggest beneficial effects of foreign institutions on firms’ financing
structure, as foreign investors contribute to a more efficient and value-enhancing cash policy.
Keywords: Foreign institutional ownership, cash holdings, agency costs, financial liberalisation
JEL codes : F65, F61, F36, G15, G12
1. Introduction
Openness to cross-border finance has brought important changes to the architecture of emerg-
ing financial markets. Financial liberalisation has contributed a great deal to integrate developing
countries’ financial markets with the global financial system, mostly driven by foreign institu-
tional investors’ quest for diversification opportunities in emerging economies. On the other hand,
whether foreign investors exert positive and desired effects on corporate behaviour remains an
unsettled issue, and a matter of polemic debate at the corporate, policy and academic domains.
As noted by Bena et al. (2017), foreign investors can be seen as locusts, for leading firms towards
short-termed strategies because of an alleged lack of commitment with long-term value creation.
On the other hand, a growing literature has brought a different and rather positive perspective
Preprint submitted to International Review of Financial Analysis December 20, 2018
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to what we know about how foreign institutional ownership affects corporate behaviour. We have
learned from this literature that foreign institutions, instead of being locusts, actually bring about
numerous beneficial effects for invested firms. Foreign institutions, against criticisms, are shown
to foster long-term value creation by enhancing capital allocation via investments and innovations
(Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017), improve corporate governance and monitoring (Huang &
Zhu, 2015; Aggarwal et al., 2011), lower the cost of equity capital (Hillier & Loncan, 2017), and
reduce stocks’ liquidity commonality via more transparent corporate policies (Deng et al., 2018).
However, one thing we do not know, which is worth learning about given its importance for the
theory and practice of finance, is whether and how foreign institutional ownership affects corporate
financing choices, a strategic managerial decision. This study contributes new knowledge to this
important debate on the effects of foreign institutional ownership on corporate behaviour, inves-
tigating if and how foreign investors affect corporate financing decisions via cash holdings policy.
This issue is relevant because cash holdings choices have crucial ramifications into the optimal
allocation of capital between financial and productive activities, and in safeguarding shareholders’
wealth against expropriation of resources stored as cash reserves.
We exploit two theoretical channels linking foreign institutional ownership with cash holdings:
mitigation of agency problems and alleviation of external finance constraints. First, while agency
costs increase firms’ propensity to accumulate liquid assets, as corporate insiders build up large
cash balances envisaging expropriating cash at the expenses of investors (Nikolov & Whited, 2014;
Fresard & Salva, 2010; Pinkowitz et al., 2006), foreign institutions can lower agency costs, by
enhancing monitoring and corporate governance, reducing insiders’ expropriation proclivity (Bena
et al., 2017; Huang & Zhu, 2015; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Stulz, 2005).
Second, while firms accumulate more cash as a liquidity cushion, to insulate growth opportuni-
ties against costly external finance (Riddick & Whited, 2009; Gamba & Triantis, 2008), openness to
cross-border finance via liberalisation and consequently the influx of foreign institutions to emerg-
ing markets lowers cost of capital and financing constraints, by enhancing risk sharing between
domestic and foreign investors, and by increasing the supply of finance (Chari & Henry, 2004;
2
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Laeven, 2003; Stulz, 1999). Building on these theoretical channels, we hypothesise that foreign
institutional ownership reduces cash holdings. Also, foreign investors’ enhanced monitoring may
reduce expropriation risks priced in firms’ stocks, increasing firm value and the value of cash. Thus,
we further hypothesise that foreign institutions increase the contribution of cash to firm value.
These two hypotheses are empirically tested for a sample of 23 emerging economies. The
empirical design consists of two analyses, in a similar spirit of Kalcheva & Lins (2007)’s study of
agency costs and cash holdings. First, cash holdings models are estimated to assess the effect of
foreign institutional ownership on the amount of cash held by firms. Second, to analyse how and
if the presence of foreign institutional investors affects the contribution of cash to firm valuation,
Tobin’s Q models are estimated, with cash holdings and foreign institutional ownership entering
the model both linearly and interacted with one another.
Findings show that, as hypothesised, foreign institutional ownership is associated to marginal
reductions in cash holdings, and that the presence of foreign institutional investors also augments
the marginal contribution of cash to firm valuation. Statistical effects are also economically signif-
icant. A 1 standard deviation increase in foreign institutional ownership can reduce cash holdings
by 0.75%. With respect to valuation, while a 1 percentage point increase in cash holdings increases
Tobin’s Q by 0.54%, out of which cash alone adds 0.489%, foreign institutional ownership con-
tributes with 0.052% via its interaction with cash. In other words, out of the total contribution of
cash to firm value, foreign institutional ownership adds approximately 10% (0.05/0.54).
Crucially, we streamline our empirical testing with the theoretical channels linking foreign insti-
tutional ownership with cash holdings, e.g, agency costs and external finance costs, by investigating
whether investor protection, monitoring by market analysts and the sensitivity of cash holdings to
cashflows influence the effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings. In general, we
find convincing evidence that agency conflicts and external finance cost are two important chan-
nels connecting foreign institutional ownership to cash holdings. Furthermore, our results remained
robust to a number of robustness checks, in particular regarding endogeneity problems.
The paper contributes to three main strands of research. First and foremost, this article
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accords novel evidence to the literature on the effects of foreign institutional ownership on corporate
behaviour, as previously pointed out. Second, the study also provides new evidence to the firm-level
financial liberalisation literature. While the extant literature analysed the effect of liberalisation on
investment (Chari & Henry, 2008), cost of capital (Chari & Henry, 2004; Bekaert & Harvey, 2000)
and productivity (Larrain & Stumpner, 2017), this paper brings a corporate finance approach by
showing that, as a response to market liberalisation, firms adjust cash policy.
Third, we contribute to the literature examining the factors affecting cash holdings policies and
the value of cash (Wu et al., 2017; Nikolov & Whited, 2014; Fresard & Salva, 2010; Dittmar &
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Opler et al., 1999), by showing
that foreign institutional ownership is a relevant determinant of cash holdings decisions, and that
it also enhances the value-added of cash holdings. Moreover, whilst Ward et al. (2018) report
positive effects of institutional investors’ monitoring on the value of cash in the U.S, results from
our paper validate such value-enhancing role played by institutional investors, extending such
important result to the context of emerging economies as well.
Taken the results of the paper altogether, while foreign institutional ownership reduces cash
balances, an important contribution of cash to firm valuation is arguably driven by foreign investors’
disciplining insiders to make good use of cash. While cash reductions may liberate resources to more
productive activities, mitigation of agency costs also explains the premium on the value of cash,
because with foreign institutional investors watching insiders closely, the likelihood of expropriation
becomes lower. In other words, foreign institutional investors may be contributing to a more
economically efficient, but above all, more trustworthy cash policy to the eyes of shareholders.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two brings the literature review and
hypotheses development. Section Three presents the data, and Section Four the methods. Sec-
tion Five brings the results, and Section Six tests the theoretical channels. Section Seven shows
robustness tests, and Section Eight concludes.
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2. Theoretical channels linking foreign institutional ownership and cash holdings
Managerial agency problems and precautionary savings driven by costly external finance are
both associated to higher cash accumulation (Amess et al., 2015). Foreign institutional ownership
can mitigate agency problems and lower external finance cost, hence affecting cash policy through
these channels. This section exploits these theoretical linkages and develops testable hypotheses.
Entrenched managers and insiders tend to build excessively high cash balances, envisaging
expropriation of minority investors, thereby increasing their personal utility by diverting cash,
tunnelling firms’ resources to investments yielding private benefits or to perquisites consumption
(Nikolov & Whited, 2014; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).
As a consequence, the cost of external finance increases the higher is asymmetric information
between insiders and external investors (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). This is consistent with the predic-
tion that excess cash holdings increases with the extent of asymmetric information (Harris & Raviv,
2017). In light of this discussion, agency problems are associated to higher cash accumulation.
On the othe hand, foreign institutional ownership can mitigate such agency conflicts. The influx
of foreign investors enhances shareholders’ discipline on insiders, as firms rent more sophisticated
monitoring technologies from developed countries (Stulz, 2005). While domestic investors may
remain loyal to their ties with insiders and managers, foreign investors are more independent,
taking a more active stance in monitoring invested firms (Ferreira & Matos, 2008).
As a consequence of financial integration, corporate governance improves over time as a result
of foreign stock ownership (Aggarwal et al., 2011), decreasing expropriation risks (Huang & Zhu,
2015). By enhancing monitoring, foreign institutional ownership makes it more costly for insiders
to expropriate, reducing insiders’ incentive to hold cash for opportunistic reasons.
The cost of external finance also increases cash holdings. When firms fund investments with
equity injections from shareholders, informational asymmetries and agency costs may result in an
underpriced stock offer (Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic & Hansen, 2003), and underwritting fees reduce
the capital raised (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2000), increasing the cost of external finance. To avoid
these costs, firms often rely upon accumulated cash to fund investments (Opler et al., 1999). In
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particular, firms with more uncertain income, lumpy investment policy and financially constrained
firms all tend to hold larger cash balances as a liquidity cushion to insulate investments (Riddick
& Whited, 2009; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007; D’Mello et al., 2008). For this reason,
cash derives its fundamental value by offering financial flexibility (Gamba & Triantis, 2008).
Foreign institutional ownership can lower the cost of external finance. First, foreign investors
enhance risk sharing with domestic investors, decreasing cost of capital (Chari & Henry, 2004;
Bekaert & Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a). Second, the influx of foreign investors increases the
supply of finance available to local firms (Stulz, 1999), contributing to reduce equity funding costs
and alleviating financing constraints (Laeven, 2003).
Third, as foreign institutions bring enhanced governance and mitigate agency costs, investors
demand a lower equity premium on firms’ stocks, further reducing the cost of equity capital. By
reducing cost of capital, foreign institutional ownership downplays the role of cash holdings in
firms’ financing structure. Because foreign institutional ownership can mitigate agency costs, and
also lower the cost of external finance, we should expect a negative effect of foreign institutional
ownership on cash holdings. This discussion leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Foreign institutional ownership decreases corporate cash holdings.
On top of affecting how much cash firms hold, foreign institutional ownership can also affect
the marginal value of cash holdings. Empirical evidence suggests that the marginal value of cash
is lower in countries with lower institutional quality and weaker investor protection (Kalcheva &
Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006), and lower for firms with weaker corporate governance (Dittmar
& Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Evidence also suggests that institutional investors increase the marginal
value of cash through enhanced monitoring (Ward et al., 2018).
In line with these findings, cross-listing via ADR (American Depositary Receipts) exposes
emerging markets’ firms to U.S investors’ monitoring and governance standards, increasing firm
value and the marginal value of cash too (Fresard & Salva, 2010; Huang et al., 2013; Doidge et al.,
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2004). This discussion suggests that foreign investors, through enhanced monitoring efforts, put
managers at check to keep cash balances at levels consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation,
reducing expropriation risks.
With investors trusting cash will be employed in the best interest of the firm, and not siphoned
away to insiders’ pockets, such lower expropriation risks are priced in firms’ stocks, with stock
prices and the marginal value of cash increasing as a response. This argument motivates our sec-
ond hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2: Foreign institutional ownership increases the contribution of cash to firm value.
3. Data and Variables
The dataset includes non-financial firms located in 23 emerging economies.1 Firm-level data
is obtained from the Osiris Database (Bureau Van Dijk), covering a period between 2006 and
2015, on a yearly basis. The dependent variable is cash holdings, calculated as cash and cash
equivalents scaled by total assets. Foreign institutional ownership, the main explanatory variable,
is the relative share of stocks which is held by foreign institutional investors. 2 Firms with
negligible foreign institutional ownership (below 1%) are excluded from the core sample, but are
analysed in robustness checks (Section 7.3), when foreign invested firms are distinguished from
strictly domestically invested firms by means of a dummy variable.
A number of control variables which can affect cash policies are also included in the dataset,
in line with the literature on the determinants of cash holdings (Chen et al., 2014; Kalcheva &
Lins, 2007; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999). Control variables
include Tobin’s Q (market value of equity plus total debt, scaled by total assets), investments (net
capital expenditures scaled by total assets), cashflows (operating cashflows scaled by total assets),
1The sample of countries is based on the constituent countries of MSCI Emerging Markets Index.
2Foreign institutional ownership is computed by summing across the equity holdings of mutual and pension funds,
investment banks, financial institutions, insurance funds, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, foundations
and hedge funds. The calculation of foreign institutional ownership does not include foreign direct investments by
non-portfolio investors (i.e, investments with long-lasting economic interests).
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net working capital (current assets, net of cash, minus current liabilities, scaled by total assets),
leverage (total debt scaled by assets), and dividend policy (a dummy variable taking the value of
1 if the firm pays dividends, and taking zero otherwise).
Additional variables are employed in robustness and extension tests. Analyst coverage works
as a proxy for monitoring (calculated as the number of brokers providing price recommendations
for firms’ stocks), return on equity reflects profitability (calculated as net income scaled by total
equity), and MSCI constituency works as an instrumental variable for foreign institutional owner-
ship (a dummy taking the value of 1 if firms are constituents of MSCI Emerging Markets Index in
a given year, and zero otherwise).
Firm-level data is complemented with country-level variables from various sources. The capital
inflow liberalisation index calculated by Jahan & Wang (2016) and the IMF (International Mon-
etary Fund) works as a proxy for capital market openness. The index runs between [0,1], with
higher scores associated to more liberalised markets and lower barriers to the free influx of foreign
financial investments.
The minority investor protection index, from World Bank Doing Business Report, works as a
country-level proxy for agency costs (expropriation risks), with higher scores obtained by countries
in the Index reflecting more stringent investor protection and hence lower agency costs. The anti-
corruption index from ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) is used as an alternative proxy
for agency costs in robustness checks (section 7.3). A variables summary is shown in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. The average cash ratio is 12 %, whereas the mean
for foreign institutional ownership is 10%. Average Tobin’s Q ratio is 1.60, investment is 6% of
total assets, cashflows correspond to 8.6% of total assets, whilst net working capital is 7% of total
assets. Average leverage ratio is 50%, and 78% of firms in the sample pay dividends. The average
firm in the sample has total assets with value of USD 1,840 million, and is covered by 4.8 analysts.
Table 3 shows country-level averages for selected variables. While firms tend to hold more cash
in countries like China, Taiwan, Philippines and Indonesia (above 10%), cash holdings are more
modest in places like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and India (below 10%). Foreign institutional
8
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Table 1: Variables Summary
Variables Legend Calculation Interpretation Source
Cash holdings cashit Cash/Assets Cash Holdings BVD
Foreign institutional own. fioit Share of Foreign Investors (%) Foreign Ownership BVD
Tobin’s Q qit (Market Cap + Debt)/Assets Growth/Valuation BVD
Investments iit Capex/Assets Investment Policy BVD
Cashflows cfit Cashflows/Assets Cashflows BVD
Working capital wcit Current (Assets-Liabilities)/Assets Liquid Assets BVD
Leverage lit Total Debt/Assets Capital Structure BVD
Return on equity rit Net Income/Equity Profitability BVD
MSCI constituency msciit 1 if MSCI Constituent, 0 otw Foreign Ownership IV MSCI
FIO (dummy) fioDit 1 if foreign invested, 0 otw Foreign Ownership BVD
Dividends (dummy) dit 1 if D > 0, 0 otw Dividend Policy BVD
Total assets tait Total Assets in USD Firm Size BVD
Analyst coverage acovi Number of analysts Monitoring BVD
Liberalisation libct Index Capital market openness IMF
Min. Investor protection mipc Index Agency costs WB
Anti-corruption anticorrupct Index Agency costs ICRG
investors are more present in countries like Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and Poland (figures above
10%). Tobin’s Q is relatively higher in countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Philippines, South
Africa and Czech Republic (near 2.0). Firms’ investment is higher in China, Russia and India.
South Korea, Qatar, Arab Emirates, Chile, Peru, Czech Republic and Greece have higher
liberalisation (scores closer to 1), whilst investor protection is stronger in South Korea, Colombia,
Arab Emirates, Qatar, India and Malaysia (investor protection above 7 points).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics. Firm-year data from 23 emerging markets is collected from Osiris (BVD),
covering a sample period of ten years (2006-2015). Cash holdings is calculated as cash and cash equivalents scaled by
total assets; foreign institutional ownership is the share of foreign institutional investors relative to firms’ total equity
capital (alternatively measured as dummy, equal to 1 for the firms with foreign institutional ownership greater than
zero, and equal to zero otherwise); Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and total debt, scaled by
total assets; investments is net capital expenditures scaled by total assets, cashflows is measured by operating cashflows
scaled by total assets, leverage is total debt scaled by total assets, working capital is calculated as current assets, net of
cash and cash equivalents, minus current liabilities, scaled by total assets; profitability is captured by return on equity,
calculated as net income divided by total equity; MSCI is a dummy, taking the value of 1 if firms are constituents of
MSCI Emerging Markets index in a given year, and zero otherwise; dividends payment is proxied by dummy, taking
the value of 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise; analyst coverage is the total number of brokers providing
recommendations on firms’ stocks; liberalisation is a country-level measure of capital inflow liberalisation, by Jahan &
Wang (2016) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), calculated as an index ranging between [0,1], with higher
scores associated with more liberalised markets; expropriation risk is proxied by the minority investor protection index
from the World Bank (WB), with higher scores associated to lower agency costs.
Variables Legend Mean Std. Dev. 25% Perc. Median 75% Perc.
Cash/Assets cashit 0.120 0.122 0.034 0.081 0.169
Foreign Ownership fioit 0.100 0.112 0.026 0.059 0.124
Tobin’s Q qit 1.600 1.330 0.910 1.170 1.760
Investments/Assets iit 0.061 0.063 0.016 0.041 0.083
Cashflows/Assets cfit 0.082 0.088 0.040 0.076 0.127
Working capital/Assets wcit 0.072 0.245 -0.051 0.062 0.207
Debt/Assets lit 0.504 0.231 0.341 0.499 0.648
Net income/Equity rit 0.137 0.189 0.057 0.138 0.229
MSCI (dummy) msciit 0.140 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dividends (dummy) dit 0.780 0.410 1.000 1.000 1.000
FIO (dummy) fioDit 0.240 0.420 0.00 0.00 0.000
Total Assets (USD mm) tait 1,840.000 3,180.000 199.140 513.260 1,617.000
Analyst Coverage acovi 4.780 7.680 0.000 1.000 7.000
Liberalisation libct 0.429 0.299 0.140 0.430 0.640
Min. Investor protection mipc 6.568 0.966 6.000 6.700 7.300
Anti-corruption Index anticorrupct 2.467 0.468 2.000 2.500 2.500
Observations 24,939
Firms 5,015
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (country averages)
Note: This Table presents country-level descriptive statistics. Firm-year data from 23 emerging markets is collected
from Osiris (BVD), covering a sample period of ten years (2006-2015). The table below shows country averages for
selected variables. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets; foreign institutional
ownership is the share of foreign institutional investors relative to firms’ total equity capital; Tobin’s Q is calculated as
the sum of market value of equity and total debt, scaled by total assets; investments is net capital expenditures scaled by
total assets, analyst coverage is the total number of brokers providing recommendations on firms’ stocks; liberalisation
is a country-level measure of capital inflows liberalisation, calculated as an index ranging between [0,1], with higher
scores associated with more liberalised markets; expropriation risk is proxied by the minority investor protection index
from the World Bank (WB), with higher scores associated to lower agency costs; the last column shows the % of firms
each country contributes to the total sample.
Countries Cash Foreign Own. Tobin’s Q Investment Analyst coverage Liberalisation Agency costs Firms.
cashit fioit qit iit acovi libct mipc %
Arab Emirates 0.14 0.06 1.02 0.03 4.17 0.79 6.00 0.39
Brazil 0.07 0.18 1.75 0.05 5.67 0.43 6.50 4.16
Chile 0.06 0.08 1.55 0.05 3.21 0.87 6.30 1.57
China 0.20 0.09 1.58 0.07 5.48 0.03 4.30 6.58
Colombia 0.06 0.09 1.64 0.06 1.36 0.14 7.30 0.42
Czech Rep. 0.11 0.12 2.21 0.09 6.17 0.88 5.80 0.16
Egypt 0.11 0.08 1.41 0.04 2.79 0.80 4.50 1.07
Greece 0.12 0.12 1.28 0.04 3.09 0.86 6.20 1.43
Hungary 0.11 0.14 1.50 0.10 3.70 0.28 5.50 0.27
Indonesia 0.12 0.09 1.96 0.06 4.50 0.33 5.30 3.67
India 0.08 0.09 1.87 0.08 8.10 0.11 7.30 17.34
South Korea 0.09 0.08 1.47 0.07 5.21 0.87 7.30 14.18
Mexico 0.08 0.15 1.70 0.06 5.61 0.26 5.80 1.70
Malaysia 0.14 0.08 1.51 0.05 4.08 0.40 7.80 6.82
Peru 0.09 0.14 1.55 0.07 2.45 0.98 6.00 0.51
Philippines 0.13 0.11 1.74 0.05 4.89 0.27 3.80 1.65
Poland 0.09 0.17 1.35 0.05 1.12 0.45 6.00 7.44
Qatar 0.20 0.11 1.72 0.07 3.71 0.86 4.50 0.17
Russia 0.09 0.11 1.96 0.11 4.25 0.45 5.70 1.85
Thailand 0.08 0.09 1.56 0.06 7.09 0.40 6.30 4.49
Turkey 0.12 0.09 1.29 0.06 4.31 0.51 6.80 3.36
Taiwan 0.18 0.07 1.49 0.04 2.80 . 6.70 16.86
South Africa 0.11 0.12 1.77 0.06 3.60 0.53 7.20 3.92
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4. Empirical models
4.1. Cash holdings model
We adopt an empirical strategy similar as employed by Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) and estimate
a dynamic panel data model via GMM (Generalised Method of Moments). Two reasons motivate
this choice. First, as the theoretical cash literature suggests that holding cash is costly (Riddick
& Whited, 2009), this dynamic structure is appropriate for recognising delays and the partial
nature of the adjustments in cash holdings due to the existence of adjustment costs. Such partial
adjustment can be accounted for by including lagged cash in the model, which captures the speed of
convergence of cash to its target level. Second, GMM estimation is required because cash holdings
and foreign institutional ownership may be endogeneous, as foreign investors may have preferences
for high-cash firms when selecting their investments (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001).
Static OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression is another empirical strategy commonly em-
ployed in the literature, such as in Caprio et al. (2013), Kalcheva & Lins (2007) and Dittmar et al.
(2003). There are two important underlying assumptions behind OLS, though. One is that cash
holdings follow a static structure, as lagged cash is usually not included in the models. Another is
that the explanatory variables are exogenous to cash holdings. Hence, our core estimation strategy
is more robust than the typical OLS model, being consistent with more stringent assumptions. In
any case, we also estimate OLS regressions as robustness checks.
We now describe our empirical model. Cash holdings is modelled as a function of lagged cash,
foreign institutional ownership and control variables. The cash model is shown in Equation 1:
cashit = αi + αt + δ · cashit−1 + β · fioit + γn · controlsit + it (1)
The vector of control variables includes Tobin’s Q, investments, cashflows, working capital,
leverage and dividends, plus year fixed effects. 3 Inherent to dynamic panel data models, Equation
3Because cash holdings and the control variables are scaled by total assets, it is not necessary to include firm
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1 is first-differenced, with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, such as firm fixed effects, wiped
out from the estimation. By using first-difference operators, endogeneity between regressors and
firm-specific unobserved effects is dealt with, and the coefficient of foreign institutional ownership
reads as a cleaner partial effect of the change in foreign institutional ownership’s share on the
change in cash holdings. 4 The first-differenced equation estimated is shown in Equation 2:
∆cashit = δ · ∆cashit−1 + β · ∆fioit + γn · ∆controlsit + ∆it (2)
Because ∆cashit−1 and ∆it are correlated by construction, this positive covariance creates en-
dogeneity biases, and estimation of the first-difference equation requires GMM (Greene, 2012; Arel-
lano & Bond, 1991; Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). Moreover, as foreign investors may have preferences
for high-cash firms, contemporaneous endogeneity might still affect the consistency of estimates.
In light of this, in addition to treating the lagged dependent variable as an endogenous covariate,
as standard practice in dynamic models, this treatment is also applied to foreign institutional own-
ership in the GMM procedure. Therefore, both lagged cash and foreign institutional ownership
are instrumented via GMM-style instruments, building on the orthogonality condition between
first-differenced errors, lagged cash levels and lagged foreign institutional ownership levels, while
the remaining exogenous explanatory variables are instrumented by standard first-differences.
Model specification is assessed by employing two tests. First, the validity of instrumental
variables is tested through the Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions, with null hypothesis
of instrument validity. Second, the Arellano-Bond test of second order serial correlation in first-
differenced errors is also employed, with null hypothesis of absence of second-order correlation.
This test is important because the orthogonality condition between first-differenced errors and
lagged endogenous variables builds upon the assumption of absence of second-order correlation.
size as a control. The role of firm size receives special attention in Section 6.3. Return on assets, a variable often
employed as a control, is redundant for its high correlation with cashflows, therefore not included in the model.
4First-differencing also wipes out the effects of other sources of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, such as
country and industry effects.
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4.2. Firm valuation model
A second model is estimated, to study the impact of foreign institutional ownership on the
contribution of cash to firm valuation. As common practice in the literature on corporate valuation,
investor protection and cash holdings, firm valuation is proxied by Tobin’s Q (Kalcheva & Lins,
2007; Lins, 2003; Porta et al., 2002; Lang & Stulz, 1994). In this literature, valuation is usually
modelled as a function of cash holdings, plus other firm-level or country-level variables, generically
labeled xit (like governance), entering the model both with a stand-alone coefficient and, most
importantly, interacted with cash holdings. This interactive term captures the effect of xit on the
marginal contribution of cash to firm valuation. In our setup, xit is foreign institutional ownership.
Tobin’s Q is a function of cash holdings, foreign institutional ownership, and the interactive term
between foreign ownership and cash, plus control variables, as specified in Equation 3 :
(log)qit = αi + αt + δ · cashit + β · fioit + η · cashit · fioit + γn · controlsit + it (3)
The η coefficient captures the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the contribution of
cash to firm valuation. The vector of control variables includes other factors affecting firm valua-
tion, such as profitability (return on equity), investments (capital expenditures), capital structure
(leverage), payout policy (dividends) and firm size (total assets). The model is estimated via panel
regressions, with firm and year fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
5. Results
5.1. The effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings
Estimation results of dynamic cash models are reported in Table 4. In the first column, a model
with foreign ownership and a single control for lagged cash is shown. The effect of foreign insti-
tutional ownership on corporate cash holdings is statistically significant and negative (-0.054**).
Also, lagged cash loads positively and significantly on current cash (0.44***), validating the dy-
namic specification of the model.
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In the second column, estimation results for the fully-fledged model, with all control variables,
is shown. Despite adding a number of controlling variables, the partial effect of foreign ownership
on cash holdings remains statistically significant and negative, and the coefficient preserves its
same order of magnitude (-0.048**). 5 The presence of the lagged dependent variable in the model
means that the coefficients of independent variables read as short-term effects (Baltagi et al., 2009).
The long-run effect of foreign institutional ownership can be obtained by computing β/(1 − δ),
where beta is the coefficient of foreign institutional ownership, and delta is the coefficient of lagged
cash: −0.048/(1 − 0.367) = −0.075. The economic effect of foreign institutional ownership on
cash holdings seems important too. Quantitatively, a 1 standard deviation in foreign institutional
ownership (0.112) is associated with a negative change of 0.75% in cash holdings.
Interpreting and discussing this negative coefficient in light of the theory and the extant lit-
erature, results provide evidence that foreign institutional ownership is associated with marginal
reductions in firms’ outstanding cash balances, suggesting that foreign investors may discipline
insiders to divest on liquid assets to mitigate expropriation risks. This finding is consistent with
the argument posited in extant research that foreign institutional investors reduce agency costs by
enhancing governance and monitoring in emerging markets (Huang & Zhu, 2015; Aggarwal et al.,
2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Stulz, 2005), corroborating Hypothesis H1.
Briefly commenting on the coefficients fitted for control variables, Tobin’s Q, cash flows and
dividends are associated to larger cash balances. The positive effect of Tobin’s Q is in line with
the idea that firms with valuable growth opportunities hold more cash (Han & Qiu, 2007; Ferreira
& Vilela, 2004). The positive association between cash holdings and cashflows captures firms’
financing-cash flow sensitivity, also known as the cashflow sensitivity of cash, and this result seems
consistent with the findings reported by Doring et al. (2018) and by Almeida et al. (2004). Div-
idends are associated to higher cash holdings, in line with Huang et al. (2013) and Chen et al.
(2014), but opposing the results reported by Kalcheva & Lins (2007).
5 Models with Windmeijer standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are also estimated (not reported for
brevity), with no material changes in the size of standard errors nor in the statistical significance of coefficients.
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Table 4: The effects of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings
Note: This Table presents estimation results for dynamic panel data cash holdings models, fitted via generalised method
of moments (GMM). The models are estimated with firm-year data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris
(BVD), covering a sample period of ten years (2006-2015). Cash/Assets is modelled as a function of Cash/Assets lagged
by one period, foreign institutional ownership, plus a vector of control variables: Tobin’s Q (in logs), investments scaled
by total assets, cashflows scaled by total assets, debt scaled by total assets, working capital scaled by total assets
and a dividends payment dummy, taking the value of 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise. Models include
year and firm fixed effects (firm effects are wiped out when first-differencing the equation). In the first column, a
baseline model with foreign institutional ownership and lagged cash is shown, whilst in the second column the fully
fledged model with all control variables is reported. Lagged cash and foreign institutional ownership enter the models as
endogenous covariates, instrumented by their own lagged levels, whilst the remaining control variables are instrumented
by standard first-differences. Two model specification tests are conducted: Sargan over-identifying restrictions test (with
null hypothesis of instrument validity) and Arellano-Bond second order serial correlation test (with null hypothesis of
absence of second-order correlation), both shown at the bottom of the table. ∗∗∗ Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant
at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
cashit = αi + αt + δ · cashit−1 + β · fioit + γn · controlsit + it
∆cashit = δ · ∆cashit−1 + β · ∆fioit + γn · ∆controlsit + ∆it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2)
Foreign Institutional -0.054** -0.048**
Ownership (0.022) (0.023)
Cash/Assets [t-1] 0.448*** 0.367***
(0.025) (0.027)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.009***
(0.003)
Investments/Assets -0.193***
(0.017)
Cashflows/Assets 0.116***
(0.014)
Working capital/Assets -0.132***
(0.012)
Debt/Assets -0.054***
(0.013)
Dividends (0/1) 0.004***
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Endogenous Variables cashit−1 cashit−1
fioit fioit
Sargan’s OVR Test (p-value) 0.166 0.202
ABond AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.575 0.815
Number of instruments 44 44
Number of Observations 21,653 19,099
Number of firms 4,562 4,224
Time series 2006-2015 2006-2015
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The negative effect of investment on cash is in line with studies reporting that firms with high
investments reduce cash, for cash is employed to finance investments (Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Huang
et al., 2013; Caprio et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014). Leverage and working capital are associated
with lower cash holdings, in line with a trade-off explanation of capital structure and cash holdings
decisions (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Harris & Roark, 2018) and with empirical
findings reported by Wu et al. (2017); Kalcheva & Lins (2007); Opler et al. (1999). Regarding
model tests, instruments are valid, as the null hypothesis of Sargan’s over-identifying restrictions
test is accepted, and there is no second-order serial correlation in first-differenced errors, as the
null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test is accepted.
5.2. Foreign institutional ownership and the contribution of cash to valuation
Having shown that foreign institutional ownership marginally reduces corporate cash, this sec-
tion analyses whether the presence of foreign investors is contributing to enhance the marginal
value of corporate cash. Estimation results for firm valuation regressions are shown in Table 5.
As shown in the first column, both cash holdings (0.489***) and foreign institutional ownership
(0.202***) load positively, with statistically significant coefficients, on Tobin’s Q, suggesting that
cash holdings and a higher share of foreign institutional ownership marginally increase corporate
valuation ratios. Most importantly, the interaction between foreign ownership and cash is also
statistically significant and positive (0.522***), also suggesting that foreign investors augment the
valuation of cash holdings. 6
Considering the interaction with foreign ownership, the partial effect of cash holdings on Tobin’s
Q is given by δˆ+ ηˆ · ¯fioit. The delta coefficient is the linear partial effect of cash on Q (0.489), the
eta coefficient is the interaction with foreign ownership (0.522), which has to be multiplied by the
average value of foreign ownership in the sample (0.10), and this product equals 0.522·0.10 = 0.052.
Therefore, the partial effect of cash on firm valuation is given by 0.489 + 0.052 = 0.541. Whilst a
1 percentage point increase in cash holdings will drive an increase in Tobin’s Q of 0.54%, foreign
6Logically, an alternative statistical interpretation is that cash holdings enhances the marginal contribution of
foreign ownership to corporate valuation, although this alternative view lacks any kind of theoretical support.
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Table 5: The effects of foreign institutional ownership on the value of cash
Note: This Table presents estimation results for Tobin’s Q (valuation) models, fitted via panel fixed effects regressions.
The models are estimated with firm-year data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD), covering a sample
period of ten years (2006-2015). In column (1), Tobin’s Q, measured in natural logarithm, and calculated as the market
value of equity plus total debt and scaled by total assets, is modelled as a function of cash and cash equivalents scaled by
total assets, foreign institutional ownership, an interaction between cash holdings and foreign institutional ownership,
plus a vector of control variables: return on equity, investments scaled by total assets, total debt scaled by total assets,
dividends, calculated as dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise, and firm size, proxied by the natural
logarithm of total assets. In column 2, a similar model design is adopted, with foreign institutional ownership replaced
by MSCI constituency, a dummy taking the value of 1 if firms are constituents of MSCI Emerging Markets index, and
zero otherwise. Models include year and firm fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. ∗∗∗ Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
(log)qit = αi + αt + δ · cashit + β · fioit + η · cashit · fioit + γn · controlsit + it
Dependent Variable: (log) Tobin’s Q (1) (2)
Cash/Assets 0.489*** 0.488***
(0.049) (0.044)
Foreign Ownership 0.202***
(0.049)
Cash x FIO 0.522**
(0.257)
MSCI (0/1) 0.184***
(0.016)
Cash x MSCI 0.245***
(0.076)
Net Income/Equity 0.540*** 0.533***
(0.019) (0.019)
(log)Total assets -0.106*** -0.118***
(0.012) (0.012)
Debt/Assets 0.447*** 0.452***
(0.029) (0.029)
Investments/Assets 0.638*** 0.626***
(0.051) (0.051)
Dividends (0/1) 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.832 0.835
Number of Observations 24,396 24,396
Number of firms 4,248 4,248
Time series 2006-2015 2006-2015
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investors increase the contribution of cash to Tobin’s Q by around 10% (0.052/0.541).
Putting this finding in perspective with those from the previous section, while foreign insti-
tutional ownership is associated with reductions in cash holdings, foreign investors are also con-
tributing an important share to increase the contribution of cash to firm valuation. The valuation
effect can come from two sides: cash reduction, which liberates resources to other applications,
and from discipline instilled by foreign institutional investors on insiders to make a proper use of
cash, which can mitigate expropriation risks and hence drive up the value of the firm and of cash.
In the second column, an alternative specification is tested, replacing foreign institutional own-
ership with MSCI constituency. This is an important test, and attenuates concerns of endogeneity
between foreign ownership and Tobin’s Q. 7 MSCI constituency is associated to higher valuations,
and the interaction between cash holdings and MSCI is statistically significant and positive.
In light of extant research, results are in line with, and extend prior findings from the cash
and governance and the cash and foreign cross-listing literatures. Specifically, previous research
has shown that good governance is associated with more efficient cash management, and to higher
marginal value of cash (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al.,
2006; Dittmar et al., 2003). Similar results are also reported in the foreign cross-listing literature, as
cross-listing in more developed capital markets, such as in the U.S, exposes emerging markets firms
to more stringent governance regimes, enhancing the value of cash (Huang et al., 2013; Fresard
& Salva, 2010). Our findings add a new perspective to the governance-cash value nexus, as it is
shown that foreign investors, arguably by instilling better governance, enhance the value of cash
in emerging economies, corroborating Hypothesis H2.
7When estimating the valuation model using MSCI as an instrumental variable for foreign ownership (not
reported for brevity), results show that foreign ownership is associated with higher valuations too, though this spec-
ification is not appealing in this case because the instrumental variables design makes it complicated to implement
the test via interaction of cash and foreign ownership.
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6. Testing the theoretical channels
6.1. Investor protection
We streamline the agency costs channel linking foreign institutional ownership with cash by
including in the model a proxy for investor protection, both linearly and interacted with foreign
institutional ownership. The linear term captures the direct effect of investor protection on cash
holdings, whereas the interaction captures a moderating (mediating) effect, as when investor pro-
tection is already high (low), the role of foreign institutions in improving governance loses (gains)
importance, therefore a weaker (stronger) effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings
is expected. That is, if good governance is lacking, its effect should be stronger where it is scarcer.
To proxy for agency costs, the Minority Investor Protection index calculated by the World
Bank is employed. Higher scores signal that countries have stronger investor protection schemes
in operation, which reduce the propensity of opportunistic agents to expropriate investors. Scores
are converted to a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for scores above the median, and zero
for scores below the median. Tests with similar designs have been previously employed in the cash
and governance literature (Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar et al., 2003).
Moreover, this test also tackles the issue of heterogeneity across emerging economies. While
emerging countries share a number of common characteristics, there could be important differences
nonetheless. The interactive term between foreign institutional ownership and investor protection
returns an equivalent effect of splitting the sample of countries in two cohorts, grouping more
homogeneous countries in terms of institutional quality together. Equation 4 is estimated via
static OLS (because investor protection is time-invariant), with results shown in Table 6:
cashit = α + αj + αt + β · fioit + δ ·mipc + λ · fioit ·mipc + γn · controlsit + it (4)
The effect of foreign institutional ownership on corporate cash remains statistically signifi-
cant and negative, despite controlling for country-level investor protection. Interestingly, in coun-
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Table 6: Effects of investor protection and foreign institutional ownership on cash
This Table presents estimation results for cash models, fitted via OLS. The models are estimated with firm-year and
country data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD) and World Bank, covering a sample period of
ten years (2006-2015). Cash/Assets ratio is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership, country-level
expropriation risks, proxied by countries’ score on the minority investor protection index by World Bank Doing Business
Report (higher scores are associated to lower expropriation risk), an interaction between foreign ownership and country-
level expropriation risk, plus control variables: Tobin’s Q (in natural logarithm), Investments/Assets, Cashflows/Assets,
Debt/Assets, Working capital/Assets and dividend policy (a dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise).
Models include year and industry fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗
Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
cashit = α+ αj + αt + β · fioit + δ ·mipc + λ · fioit ·mipc + γn · controlsit + it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2)
Foreign Ownership (FIO) -0.033*** -0.044***
(0.007) (0.009)
Investor Protection (MIP) -0.024*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002)
FIO x MIP 0.032**
(0.014)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.002) (0.002)
Investment/Assets -0.189*** -0.188***
(0.014) (0.014)
Cashflow/Assets 0.230*** 0.230***
(0.014) (0.014)
Working capital/Assets -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.006) (0.006)
Debt/Assets -0.097*** -0.096***
(0.006) (0.006)
Dividends (0/1) 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.295 0.295
N 24,939 24,939
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tries with stronger investor protection schemes and therefore lower expropriation risk, firms hold
marginally less cash. This is consistent with the idea that more stringent governance at country-
level may discourage opportunistic behaviours by insiders, resulting in lower cash accumulation.
The interaction between foreign institutional ownership and investor protection is statistically
significant and positive. The interpretation of this positive interaction is that in countries where
investor protection is higher (lower), the effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings
is weaker (stronger). In other words, in countries where expropriation of minority investors goes
unpunished, the negative effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings is stronger,
corroborating the idea that foreign institutions are enhancing surveillance and bringing good gov-
ernance to poor-governance places, disciplining insiders to accumulate less cash.
6.2. Analyst coverage and monitoring
The literature suggests that market analysts play a crucial role in information distribution,
intensifying external monitoring (To et al., 2018; Chan & Hameed, 2006; Irvine, 2003). The
greater is the number of brokers providing stock recommendations, more people care about and
gain access to the information released by firms and, all else equal, stock price informativeness
improves and asymmetric information problems should be mitigated. In line with these evidences,
we use analyst coverage as a proxy for monitoring.
Cash is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership, plus analyst coverage, and
an interaction between analyst coverage and foreign institutional ownership, control variables,
plus industry and year fixed effects. The interaction captures the effect of foreign institutional
ownership on cash when monitoring by analysts is already strong. The model shown in Equation
5 is estimated, and results are reported in Table 7:
cashit = α + αj + αt + β · fioit + δ · acovi + λ · fioit · acovi + γn · controlsit + it (5)
As shown in the first column of the table, both foreign institutional ownership and analyst
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Table 7: The effects of foreign institutional ownership and monitoring on cash holdings
This Table presents estimation results for cash models, fitted via ordinary least squares. The models are estimated with
firm-year data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD), covering a sample period of ten years (2006-
2015). Cash/Assets ratio is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership, analyst coverage (the natural log of
total number of brokers providing firms’ stock recommendations), an interaction between foreign ownership and analyst
coverage, plus control variables: Tobin’s Q (in natural logarithm), Investments/Assets, Cashflows/Assets, Debt/Assets,
Working capital/Assets and dividend policy (a dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise). Models
include year and industry fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗ Significant
at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
cashit = α+ αj + αt + β · fioit + δ · acovi + λ · fioit · acovi + γn · controlsit + it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2)
Foreign Ownership (FIO) -0.021** -0.068***
(0.009) (0.017)
(log) Analysts Coverage (ACOV) -0.007*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
FIO x ACOV 0.026***
(0.009)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.003) (0.003)
Investments/Assets -0.239*** -0.239***
(0.019) (0.019)
Cashflows/Assets 0.323*** 0.322***
(0.019) (0.019)
Working capital/Assets -0.155*** -0.155***
(0.009) (0.009)
Debt/Assets -0.056*** -0.056***
(0.008) (0.008)
Dividends (0/1) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.354 0.354
N 14,699 14,699
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coverage exert a statistically significant and negative effect on corporate cash holdings. The inter-
action of foreign institutional ownership and analyst coverage loads statistically significantly and
positively on corporate cash. The implication is that when monitoring by investment analysts is
already relatively higher, the marginal reduction in cash holdings brought about by foreign in-
vestors’ monitoring is weaker (or conversely, stronger when firms are covered by a smaller number
of analysts). The interpretation is that when existing monitoring is high, foreign investors con-
tribute less with enhanced discipline on managers. In other words, foreign investors add more to
governance when existing market monitoring is poorer, thus improving monitoring.
6.3. Financing constraints
This section tests for the financing constraints channel. In line with the argument developed in
the literature section, foreign institutional ownership may help reducing equity financial constraints
by making external finance relatively cheaper. In order to assess how foreign institutional ownership
may be affecting financing constraints, two tests are conducted.
Financial constraints can be captured by firms’ propensity to save cash holdings out of cash-
flows, also referred to in the literature as the cashflow sensitivity of cash, or the financing-cash flow
sensitivity (Almeida et al., 2004; Doring et al., 2018). On the other hand, Khurana et al. (2006)
suggest that local financial development reduces firms’ cash holdings sensitivity with respect to
cashflows. Considering that cross-border finance and the associated influx of foreign investors
to emerging economies improves financial development (Rajan & Zingales, 2003), the first test
inspects whether foreign institutional ownership reduces the cashflow sensitivity of cash holdings.
Additional models are estimated, with cash holdings modelled as a function of foreign institu-
tional ownership, plus a dummy equal to 1 for high cashflow firms (with cashflows scaled by assets
above the sample’s median), and zero otherwise, and plus an interaction between foreign institu-
tional ownership and the high cashflows dummy, which captures the effect of foreign institutional
ownership on firms’ propensity to save cash holdings out of cashflows. Equation 6 is estimated:
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cashit = α + αj + αt + β · fioit + γ · CFit + η · fioit · CFit + λ · controlsit + it (6)
Second, as smaller firms are more likely to be financially constrained (for they have lower access
to external finance and lower collateral to offer in debt contracts) and therefore tend to hold more
cash, it is tested whether foreign institutional ownership reduces the sensitivity of cash holdings
with respect to firm size. Cash is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership, plus a
dummy equal to one for small firms and zero for large firms (small firms with total assets below
sample’s median), and plus an interaction between foreign institutional ownership and firm size,
which captures the effect of foreign institutional ownership on small firms’ propensity to save cash
out of cashflows. Equation 7 is also estimated:
cashit = α + αj + αt + β · fioit + γ · Smallit + η · fioit · Smallit + λ · controlsit + it (7)
Table 8 reports the results. As shown in column (1), higher cashflow generation is associated
to higher propensity to save cash. As reported in column (2), given the negative and statistically
significant interaction between cashflows and foreign institutional ownership, foreign institutions
reduce the propensity of firms to accumulate cash holdings out of internally generated cashflows.
Findings reported in Columns (3) and (4) show that small firms hold more cash when compared
to large firms, corroborating the idea that smaller firms tend to be relatively more financially con-
strained. More interestingly, the negative interaction between small firms and foreign institutional
ownership suggests that foreign institutions may reduce the sensitivity of cash holdings to firm
size. Taken these findings on the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the sensitivity of cash
holdings to both cashflows and firm size altogether, empirical evidence is aligned with the idea
that foreign institutional ownership alleviates financing constraints.
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Table 8: The effect of foreign institutional ownership on financing constraints
This Table presents estimation results for cash holdings models, fitted via ordinary least squares. The models are
estimated with firm-year data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD), covering a sample period of
ten years (2006-2015). In columns (1) and (2), cash ratio is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership,
a dummy for high cashflows firms, taking one for firms with cashflows scaled by assets above the median, and zero
otherwise, plus an interaction between foreign institutional ownership and high cashflow firms, with the interaction
capturing the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the cashflow sensitivity of cash holdings. In columns (3) and
(4), cash ratio is modelled as a function of foreign institutional ownership, a dummy for firm size, taking the value of
one for firms with total assets below the median, and zero otherwise (small=1, large=0), plus an interaction between
foreign institutional ownership and the dummy for small firms, capturing the effect of foreign institutional ownership
on the size sensitivity of cash holdings. Control variables include: Tobin’s Q (in natural log), Investments/Assets,
Cashflows/Assets, Debt/Assets, Working capital/Assets and dividend policy (a dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends,
and zero otherwise). Models include year and industry fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. ∗∗∗ Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level..
cashit = α+ αj + αt + β · fioit + γ · CFit + η · fioit · CFit + λ · controlsit + it
cashit = α+ αj + αt + β · fioit + γ · Smallit + η · fioit · Smallit + λ · controlsit + it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Ownership (FIO) -0.019*** 0.005 -0.025*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
High Cashflows (CF) 0.020*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002)
FIO x CF -0.034**
(0.014)
Size (Small) 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.004)
FIO x Small -0.052*
(0.032)
Tobin’s Q 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Investments/Assets -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.212*** -0.213***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Cashflows/Assets 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.014) (0.014)
Working Capital/Assets -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.132*** -0.132***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Debt/Assets -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.096*** -0.096***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Dividends (0/1) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.270 0.271 0.288 0.289
N 24,939 24,939 24,939 24,939
26
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
7. Robustness checks
7.1. Instrumental variables
While foreign institutional ownership is modelled as an endogenous covariate in the dynamic
cash model shown in the Results section, instrumental variables models can further contribute to
an even cleaner identification. To put more structure on the reliability of econometric results, cash
holdings models are again estimated, this time via instrumental variables GMM regressions.
MSCI Constituency serves as instrumental variable (zit) capturing exogenous variation in for-
eign institutional ownership, following a widely employed practice in the foreign institutional own-
ership literature (Bena et al., 2017; Hillier & Loncan, 2017; Aggarwal et al., 2011). This variable
is calculated as dummy, taking the value of 1 if the firm is a constituent of MSCI Emerging Mar-
kets Index, and zero otherwise, tracking both additions and deletions over time, being statistically
correlated with foreign ownership (0.24, p < 0.01). Equation 8 is estimated:
(log)cashit = αi + αt + β · [zit](log)fioit + γn · controlsit + it (8)
In the first column, First-stage results are shown. MSCI constituency is statistically and posi-
tively associated to marginal increases in foreign stock ownership (0.09***), being thus a relevant
instrument. In the second column, Second-stage results are reported. Foreign ownership, as in-
strumented by MSCI Constituency, marginally reduces cash holdings (-0.763**), and this effect is
statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Kleibergen-Paap under-identification and weak-
identification tests suggest strong identification in the IV model, as both null hypotheses of under
and weak identification of instruments are rejected. This result, again, supports Hypothesis H1,
corroborating the idea that the influx of foreign investors reduces firms’ incentives to hold cash.
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Table 9: Instrumental variables model
This Table presents estimation results for cash models, fitted via two-stages instrumental variables regressions (GMM).
The models are estimated with firm-year data from 23 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD), covering a sample
period of ten years (2006-2015). Cash/Assets (in natural logarithm) is modelled as a function of foreign institutional
ownership (in natural logarithm), instrumented by MSCI constituency (zit), a dummy taking the value of 1 if firms
are constituents of MSCI Emerging Markets index, and zero otherwise, plus a vector of control variables: Tobin’s Q
(in natural logarithm), investments scaled by total assets, cashflows scaled by total assets, total debt scaled by total
assets, working capital scaled by total assets, and dividends, calculated as a dummy taking the value of 1 if firms pay
dividends, and zero otherwise. Models include year and firm fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. In column (1), first-stage results are reported, whilst column (2) shows second-stage results. The
strength of instrumental variables is tested by the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification and weak-identification tests
(both tests with null hypotheses of under and weak identification), shown at the bottom of the table. ∗∗∗ Significant at
0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
(log)cashit = αi + αt + β · [zit](log)fioit + γn · controlsit + it
Dependent Variables: (log) Cash/Assets, (log) FIO (1) (2)
First Stage Second Stage
Dependent Variable Foreign Ownership Cash Holdings
MSCI (0/1) 0.090***
(0.024)
(log) Foreign Instit. Ownership -0.763**
(0.381)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.215*** 0.406***
(0.019) (0.087)
Investments/Assets 0.479*** -0.051
(0.106) (0.252)
Cashflows/Assets 0.134 1.320***
(0.097) (0.159)
Working capital/Assets 0.112*** -0.459***
(0.035) (0.070)
Debt/Assets -0.402*** -0.900***
(0.055) (0.179)
Dividends (0/1) 0.081*** 0.131***
(0.014) (0.037)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Under-identification 17.63***
Weak identification 14.50***
R2 0.767 0.706
N 21,159 21,159
Firms 3,990 3,990
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7.2. The effect of country-level stock market liberalisation on firm-level cash holdings
In this section, a measure of country-level capital inflow liberalisation is employed as proxy for
the influx of foreign investors, drawn from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) database. 8
The capital inflow liberalisation index captures openness to foreign capital flows (libct), calculated
by Jahan & Wang (2016). This index runs between [0,1], with higher scores associated to lower
barriers to the free inflow of foreign investments in equities and bonds.
Given country-level data is exogenous to individual firms’ characteristics by construction, such
liberalisation measure contributes with cleaning identification again. 9 The model shown in Equa-
tion 9 is estimated, and estimation results are reported in Table 10:
cashit = α + αj + αt + αc + β · libct + γn · controlsit + it (9)
Results reported in the first column show that firms located in countries obtaining a higher
score in the liberalisation index hold marginally less cash (-0.022***), suggesting that liberalisa-
tion affects firms’ cash policy. In the second column, another model is estimated, this time wiping
out country fixed effects, such that the effect of liberalisation is not influenced by countries’ un-
observed heterogeneity, and results remain materially unchanged. Crucially, putting this analysis
in perspective with the previous results shown in the paper, qualitatively similar effects on cash
holdings (reductions) are obtained when using both firm-level (foreign institutional ownership) and
country-level (liberalisation) variables capturing foreign investors activity in the market.
Whilst a number of papers show that stock market liberalisation reduces cost of equity capital
(Henry, 2000b; Bekaert & Harvey, 2000; Patro & Wald, 2005; Christoffersen et al., 2006), other
strands of literature report that liberalisation induces investment booms, productivity gains and
8Because country liberalisation and capital flows estimates are unavailable, firms from Taiwan are dropped from
this analysis.
9In line with the idea that country-level liberalisation is associated to a higher presence of foreign investors,
country-level foreign institutional ownership and the capital inflow liberalisation index are positively and statistically
significantly correlated, and liberalisation at the country-level and cash holdings at the firm-level are statistically
and negatively correlated too.
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Table 10: The effect of country-level market liberalisation on firm-level cash holdings
This Table presents estimation results for cash models, fitted via OLS regressions. The models are estimated with firm-
year and country-year data from 22 emerging markets, collected from Osiris (BVD) and the IMF, covering a sample
period of ten years (2006-2015). In the model shown in column (1), Cash/Assets ratio is modelled as a function of coun-
tries’ capital inflow liberalisation, an index ranging between [0,1], with higher scores associated to countries with more
liberalised markets. Models include a vector of control variables: Tobin’s Q (in natural logarithm), Investments/Assets,
Cashflows/Assets, Debt/Assets, Working capital/Assets and dividend policy (a dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends,
and zero otherwise), year and industry fixed effects (the model in column 2 also includes country fixed effects). Models
are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗ Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level;
∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
cashit = α+ αj + αt + αc + β · libct + γn · controlsit + it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2)
Liberalisation [0,1] -0.022** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.009)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.002)
Investment/Assets -0.140*** -0.117***
(0.014) (0.014)
Cashflow/Assets 0.210*** 0.212***
(0.014) (0.014)
Working capital/Assets -0.076*** -0.083***
(0.007) (0.007)
Debt/Assets -0.059*** -0.069***
(0.006) (0.006)
Dividends (0/1) 0.004** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes
R2 0.237 0.310
N 20,212 20,206
Firms 3,485 3,485
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economic growth (Henry, 2000a; Bekaert et al., 2005; Chari & Henry, 2008; Quinn & Toyoda, 2008;
Bonfiglioli, 2008; Bekaert et al., 2011; Larrain & Stumpner, 2017). The findings from the analysis of
country-level liberalisation effects on cash holdings contribute new evidence to the current-account
liberalisation literature, by showing that liberalisation affects not only cost of capital, investment
and productivity, also affecting cash holdings policy.
7.3. Foreign invested versus strictly domestically invested firms
In our core analysis we dropped those firms with zero or irrelevant foreign institutional owner-
ship. However, it is interesting to see if foreign-invested firms also hold less cash when compared
to strictly domestically-invested firms. In this section we analyse this possibility.
We separate foreign-invested from domestically-invested firms employing a dummy, fioDit , equal
to 1 for firms with foreign institutional ownership greater than zero, and equal to zero otherwise.
In this setup, many firms are brought back to the analysis, allowing estimating models with a
much larger sample. As another additional sensitivity check, we use a different proxy for agency
costs, employing the Anti-corruption index, sourced from International Country Risk Guide, adding
robustness to the the agency costs channel test. Equation 10 is estimated:
cashit = α + αj + αt + β · fioDit + δ · anticorrupct + λ · fioDit · anticorruptct + it (10)
Table 11 shows the results. The dummy distinguishing foreign invested from strictly domesti-
cally invested firms is significant and negative. Therefore, foreign invested firms accumulate less
cash than strictly domestically invested firms. While firms hold less cash in less corrupt countries,
the interaction between the foreign/domestic dummy and the Anti-corruption index is significant
and positive, hence foreign institutions exert weaker effects when corruption is lower.
In column 3, we analyse whether the effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings
has changed over time. We code a dummy, splitting our sampling period in two equal sub-periods
of 5 years each. This dummy is named Post 2010, and equals 1 for the years after 2010 (2011-2015),
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Table 11: Foreign invested versus strictly domestically invested firms
This Table presents estimation results. Models are estimated with data from 23 emerging markets, collected from
Osiris (BVD), covering a sample period of ten years (2006-2015). Cash/Assets ratio is modelled as a function of foreign
institutional ownership (measured as a dummy, equal to 1 for firms with foreign institutional ownership greater than
zero, and equal to zero otherwise), country-level agency costs, proxied by countries’ score on the anti-corruption index
from International Country Risk Guide (higher the score, lower is corruption), an interaction between foreign ownership
and anti-corruption, plus control variables: Tobin’s Q (in natural logarithm), Investments/Assets, Cashflows/Assets,
Debt/Assets, Working capital/Assets and dividend policy (a dummy taking 1 if firms pay dividends, and zero otherwise).
Models include year and industry fixed effects, and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗
Significant at 0.01 level; ∗∗ Significant at 0.05 level; ∗ Significant at 0.1 level.
cashit = α+ αj + αt + β · fioDit + δ · anticorrupct + λ · fioDit · anticorruptct + it
Dependent Variable: Cash/Assets (1) (2) (3)
Foreign Owership (Dummy) -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anti-corruption Index (Anticorrup) -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001)
FIO x Anticorrupt 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
FIO x Post 2010 -0.003*
(0.002)
(log) Tobin’s Q 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Investment/Assets -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.165***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cashflow/Assets 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Working capital/Assets -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Debt/Assets -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.177***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dividends (0/1) 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.246 0.248 0.248
N 90,998 90,998 90,998
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and equals zero for the years before and including 2010 (2006-2010). We interact this variable with
foreign institutional ownership (FIO x Post 2010). This interaction captures the change in the
effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings in the most recent sampling period (2011-
2015) as opposed to the initial sampling period (2006-2010). The interaction resulted significant
and negative, suggesting the effect may be time-varying and possibly became stronger over time.
8. Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings. It is
hypothesised that foreign institutional ownership, by mitigating agency costs and by lowering
external finance cost, reduces firms’ propensity to accumulate cash. Moreover, by disciplining
managers to stick to efficient cash levels and by preventing expropriation, it is also hypothesised
that foreign institutional ownership increases the contribution of cash to firm valuation.
These hypotheses are empirically tested for a sample of firms from 23 emerging economies.
Results show that, as hypothesised, a larger share of foreign institutional ownership is associated
to marginal reductions in corporate cash holdings. Moreover, foreign institutional ownership drives
a premium on the marginal value of cash, consistent with the idea that foreign investors contribute
to a more efficient, value-enhancing and trustworthy corporate cash management.
By inspecting a number of theoretical mechanisms, we further provide empirical evidence consis-
tent with our hypotheses that mitigation of agency conflicts and reduction of external finance costs
are two important channels linking foreign institutional ownership to cash holdings. Moreover, our
results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. Particular attention is given to identification
issues. Models fitted via dynamic panel GMM, instrumental variables and regressions employing
country-level liberalisation measures all yielded consistent results, robust to endogeneity concerns.
The findings from our paper have important economic implications, and also contribute relevant
insights to the finance literature. In terms of economic effects, our results suggest that foreign
institutional investors are pushing firms towards a more efficient and rational cash management.
As a result of reductions in the levels of cash holdings, more economic resources become available to
33
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
be allocated in other activities which can contribute to firms’ growth, such as corporate investments.
Moreover, by deterring cash expropriation via enhanced governance, foreign investors prevent the
dissipation of valuable economic resources which rightfully belong to firms and their shareholders,
contributing to a better economic and institutional environment in emerging economies.
In addition, foreign institutions are also shown to create economic value to firms by increasing
the marginal value of cash as priced in the stock market by investors. That is, through enhanced
governance, foreign institutional investors seem to be contributing to increase the valuation of
firms. This financial effect can spillover to real economic output as well. For instance, a higher
valuation can reduce the cost of equity capital, which can allow firms to invest even more.
With respect to our contributions to the academic debate in this area, while existing studies
suggest that foreign institutions create value via lowering cost of capital and by increasing invest-
ments and innovations, our findings complement and extend prior studies by adding a financing
structure perspective, as we demonstrate that foreign institutions also exert beneficial effects on
firms’ cash management. In all, putting our results in perspective with the extant literature, for-
eign institutional investors seem to contribute towards optimising the allocation balance between
financial and productive capital within invested firms. This adds to the notion currently advocated
in the literature that foreign institutions enhance corporate managerial decisions.
The paper has a number of limitations, though. The analysis falls short of a firm-specific internal
measure of expected agency costs, other than foreign institutional ownership, such as governance
and board data. The sample studied includes emerging economies, but leaves out other relevant
countries, in particular frontier markets. The analysis neglects other financing choices, in particular
leverage. In fact, implications of foreign institutional ownership and of financial liberalisation to
firms’ capital structure seems an interesting research avenue for papers to come.
While acknowledging such limitations, the paper adds new evidence on the pros and cons
of the ever increasing presence of foreign investors in emerging economies, with results suggesting
beneficial effects of foreign institutions on corporate managerial decisions of emerging market firms,
reflected in more efficient and value-enhancing cash policies.
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Highlights 
 Foreign Institutional Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings
 The paper investigates the effect of foreign institutional ownership on corporate cash
holdings in an emerging markets setting.  
 Results indicate that while foreign institutional ownership is associated to reductions
in cash holdings, foreign institutions also increase the contribution of cash to firm
value. 
 These effects are potentially transmitted to cash and valuation through the mitigation
of agency costs and alleviation of financing constraints. 
 The results from the paper suggest beneficial effects of foreign institutional ownership
on firms’ financing structure, as foreign institutions contribute to a more efficient and
value-enhancing cash management. 
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